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Abstract:
Patterns of commodity trade and foreign direct investment are not consistent with the pro-
position that European economies are experiencing a process of increasing ‘globalization’.
Internationalization takes place as economic integration within the European Union and the
European Union apparently does not become more integrated with the World’s other two
trade blocs. Moreover, other than globalization theory might cause us to predict, the share
in foreign direct investment taken by low-wage countries shows little growth. We try to ex-
plain such findings, using arguments about the nature of the process of techuological
change.
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I Introduction
In recent years, there has been a great deal of writing about an increasing ‘mondialization’ or
‘globalization’ of the World economy. Recent progress in information and communication tech-
nology and the intemet hype have created the impression that geographic distance is losing signi-
ficance for business. Moreover, the relatively successful industrialisation of several low wage
Asiatic countries gave rise to concern that an increasing challenge from international competition
might undermine employment and welfare in Europe.
In this context, it has frequently been argued that Europe is suffering from competitive disadvan-
tages relating to such factors as too high (and downwardly rigid) wages, too much regulation
(‘Eurosclerosis’), a heavy social security tax burden and a too generous protection of the people
by the welfare state, preventing an adequate working of the labour  market. If correct, such argu-
ments would have obvious and far-reaching implications for economic and social policy in the
European Union.
Arguments about economic globalization very often are based on case studies and anecdotal evi-
dence while little effort seems to have been taken to examine representative economic statistics.
In section II we start with a look at standard statistical sources, arguing that patterns of foreign ‘p
trade and of foreign direct investment of EU countries are nof  consistent with globalization
theory. We conclude that internationalization takes place as economic integration within the EU
bloc. Furthermore, to the extent that the frontiers of the European Union are exceeded, the
lion’s share of such transactions still takes place among the rich OECD countries. Moreover,
one might question the proposition that we are currently experiencing an historically unique new
stage of internationalization.
In our final section, we argue that there are good theoretical reasons to doubt the globalization
hypothesis. In doing so, we refer to literature about the nature of technological knowledge and
about technological spill-overs. We argue that, at least for knowledge-intensive business, the for-
ces behind ‘regionalization’ (or even ‘localisation’)  may be stronger than those promoting ‘glo-
balization’ .
II Patterns of foreign trade and investment
4 Foreign trade
Are we experiencing a uniquely new stage of internationalization of the world economy? As a
rough indicator of internationalization, Table 1 shows the sum of exports plus imports as a per-
centage of GNP of a number of advanced industrialized countries.
In 1973 exports and imports as a percentage of GNP in most countries were lower than in 1913.
This was due to the fact that international trade had suffered from two World Wars and from in-
creasing protectionism induced by the economic slowdown after 1929. Although world trade has
been recovering since the 1950s  some countries in 1994 had not even reached the 1913 levels.
Table 1: Exports and imports of goods as a percentage of GNP (current prices) according to
Maddison (199 1: 149)
1 9 1 3 1 9 5 0 1 9 7 3 1 9 9 4
France 30.0 21.4 29.2 34.2
Germany 36.1 20.1 35.3 39.3
UK 47.2 37.1 37.6 41.8
Netherlands wo* 70.9 74.8 89.2
USA 11.2 6.9 10.8 17.8
Japan 30. 16.4 18.2 14.6
.
The figure of 100% reported by Maddison has been called into question by Lindblad & Van Zanden (1989:
231-269). After a (rough) correction for Dutch transit trade, they suggest that the real figure should be around 60%.
Against this interpretation, one can argue that Table 1 understates the ‘true’ degree of intematio-
nalization since current prices are used. Sectors that are exposed to international competition
usually have a stronger technological dynamism and show higher rates of productivity growth
than ‘sheltered’ sectors that are oriented towards domestic markets. In the long run, the diffe-
rence in technological performance between ‘sheltered’ and ‘exposed’ sectors will result in infla-
tion rate differentials, implying that inflation rates of GNP tend to be higher than inflation rates
of exports and imports. Hence, when using the ratio of exports to GNP at current prices, the de-
gree of internationalization appears to be much lower than when using constant prices (Mensink
& Van Bergeijk 1996: 914).
This would be a valid objection if we were to study economic growth over time (with an implicit
emphasis on physical quantities). However, we are interested in the relative economic impor-
tance of domestic versus foreign transactions Inflation is not merely a monetary phenomenon
and insofar as inflation rate differentials reflect ‘real’ factors such as market power or produc-
tivity growth differentials, prices actually realised  give a more realistic impression of the relative
importance of an economic activity. It is therefore questionable whether exports and GNP in
Table 1 should be deflated, making it understandable that statistical agencies tend to report ex-
ports and imports as percentages of GNP in current prices.
While deflated series tend to show a much increased importance of foreign trade as a percentage
of GNP (see Mensink  & Van Bergeijk 1996: 194),  the data in current prices (Table 1) show that
the relative importance of foreign trade is at present not exceptionally high by historical stan-
dards. Nevertheless, exports and imports have gained importance since the 1950s even accord-
ing to our Table 1. Does this prove that we are living in a stage of ‘globalization’?
For a judgement about this we should examine where imports come from and where exports go
to. Table 2 shows exports of EU countries (as a percentage of GDP) to other countries of the
European Union, while Table 3 shows exports of EU countries to non-EU countries. It becomes
obvious from Table 2 that trade among EU partners has strongly gained in importance since the
196Os,  whereas the relative importance of exports to non-EU partners (Table 3) tended to stag-
nate. Table 3 shows that only a few EU countries increased trade (as a percentage of GDP) with
non-EU partners; in most countries, the relevant percentages stagnated or even diminished. Fi-
gures on imports which can be found in the same source (European Commission 1996) show a
similar pattern. Table 4 summarises exports and imports of the EU-12 countries with EU and
non-EU countries and shows clearly that, for the average EU-12, intra-EU exports as a percen-
tage of EU GDP more than doubled. The same holds for imports. Exports of the EU-12 to non-
EU countries stagnated, while the percentage share in GDP of imports from non-EU countries
even declined slightly.
In summary, the three tables show a clear trend towards ‘Europeanization’ of export and import
relations over the past 35 years, while the relative importance of trade with non-EU partners has
stagnated. In other words, the EU as a trade bloc does not seem to become more integrated with
the World economy as suggested by globalization theorists. This implies that the increase in the
overall importance of foreign trade since the 1960s (shown in Table 1) is to be ascribed to a pro-
cess of ‘regionahzation’ (or European bloc formation) rather than to ‘globalization’.
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Table 2: Exports of goods by EU countries to other EU countries (as a percentage of GDP,
current prices)
Austria 10.1* 1 1 . 1 13.5 17.9 15.5
Portugal 4.5 7.1 10.6 19.7 17.4
Finland 10.7* 13.5 15.8 11.9 18.0
Sweden 10.9* 12.2 14.4 1 5 . 5 20.5
United Kingdom 3.3 6.1 10.6 10.9 1 2 . 1
EU-12 (excl.  AT, SE and FI) 6.0 9.9 13.4 14.7+ 14.4ff
EU-15 7.8* 1 0 . 1 1 3 . 5 14.7+ 14.6’
* 1963
+  including West Germany
# including East and West Germany
Source: European Commission (1996)
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Table 3: Exports of goods by EU countries to non-EU countries (as a percentage of GDP,
current prices)
country of origin: 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Belgium/Luxembourg 12.7 9.6 1 2 . 3 1 2 . 5 14.6
Denmark 10.6 7.4 8.2 9.5 10.9
(West)  Germany 9.5 7.5 9.3 9.5’ 9.0”
Sweden 6.7* 8.0 10.0 9.4 1 4 . 7
United Kingdom 11.0 9.5 10.7 8 . 1 9.1
EU-12 (exe].  AT, SE and FI) 8.7 6.8 8.5 7.5+ 8 . 9
EU-15 6.1* 6.9 8.6 7.6+ 8.9”
* 1963
+  including West Germany
# including East and West Germany
Source: European Commission (1996)
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Table 4: Inside EU goods trade versus outside EU goods trade as a percentage of GDP,
market prices (EU-12)
Source: European Commission (1996)
b) Foreign direct investment
Globalization theory could still be defended against our above argument by saying that the pro-
cess of globalization is not adequately measured by foreign trade figures. The core of the globa-
lization process might be argued to be the movement of capital rather than of exported goods
across the globe. Instead of exporting goods, one builds factories. In principle, this process
could even be accompanied by decreasing export and import figures, while the international de-
pendency of economies may increase. We shall examine this proposition below by examining
data about foreign direct investment of European countries.
Systematic figures on the development of foreign direct investment are sparse. We found infor-
mation on Germany (from the Monatsberichre  der Deutschen Bundesbank), on Great ‘Britain
(from the Q@ice  of National Statistics) and for the Netherlands (from the Annual Report of the
Central Bank, DA!@.  Moreover, the OECD published data on France.’ These data are shown in
Tables 5-8.
* The various issues of the OECD Review of Foreign Direct Investment are far from complete.
In addition to the data on France, we found less systematic pieces of information on smaller
EU countries which seem to confirm that the poorer countries (often referred to as ‘non-
OECD’) play a minor role. For example, Finland directed 11% of its FDI to non-OECD
countries during 1982-87 and 10.4% during 1988-94. In Denmark, the corresponding per-
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Table 5 Foreign direct investment of UK companies by World regions
1 9 8 7
1 9 8 8
1 9 8 9
1990
1991
1 9 9 2
1 9 9 3
1 9 9 4
total FDI of percentages of which were directed to:
UK; billion EU and Non-Europe- Rest of
pounds; cur- Western an Developed World
rent prices Europe countries
19 159 15.3% 74.5% 10.1%
20 916 27.3% 63.4% 8.4%
2 1 4 9 1 26.1% 63.2% 10.6%
10 108 57.4% 20.6% 22.0%
9304 42.6% 41.4% 16.0%
10 107 4 8 . 3  % 23.7% 28.0%
16 859 36.3% 50.3% 13.5%
18 514 3 6 . 3  % 40.6% 23.1%
of which:
developing
countries’
10.1%
8.3%
10.6%
21.5%
15.8%
27.7%
13.2%
21.4%
@  excluding Japan
# excluding Eastern  Europe
centages  are 5.8% (1985-92) and 11% in 1993, and in Portugal 12% during 1986-92. How-
ever, other countries show somewhat higher percentages. The share of non-OECD countries
in Italy’s FDI was 27.6% in (1982-96) and 32.3% in 1987-92. In Switzerland, the corre-
sponding figure for 1994 is 21.2 % and for Norway we found the figures of 43.5 % for 1986
and 19.6% in 1993. Whether the latter three cases give support to globalization theory re-
mains doubtful. A good judgment would require data over longer time periods, since FDI fig-
ures (as all investment figures) tend to show strong variations over time.
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of which
Asia@
2.4%
2.3%
2.6%
6.5%
9.2%
9.4%
9.8%
9.9%
Table 6 Foreign direct investment of German companies by World regions
1 9 7 9
1981
1 9 8 7
1 9 8 9
1991
1 9 9 3
total German percentages of which were directed to:
FDI; billion EU- 12 coun- other indus- Develop. and
DM; current tries trialized transition
prices countries countries
69.5 39.6% 37.3% 23.2%
101.2 36.0% 38.5% 23.3%
150.9 40.8% 46.3% 12.9%
205.6 43.7% 45.2% 11.1%
262.7 51.0% 38.3% 10.7%
319.4 48.0% 39.5% 12.6%
HongKong,  Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan
of which:
4 Asian
tigers#
0.9%
1.2%
2.2%
2.3%
2.2%
2.4%
Table 7 Foreign direct investment of French companies by World regions
1 9 8 6
1987
1 9 8 8
1 9 8 9
1 9 9 0
1991
1 9 9 2
1 9 9 3
1994
1 9 8 0 - 8 5
1986-94
total French of which were directed to:
FDI; billion EU-12 other Europe USA and other OECD
Francs; cur- countries Canada countries
rent prices
32 115 33.5% 7.6% 44.8% 2.6%
49 012 53.9% 4.7% 33.4% 1.7%
73 018 ‘63.5% 5.8% 25.4% 1.2%
109 521 62.2% 4.2% 26.6% 2.1%
142 813 67.9% 5.3% 22.6% 1.0%
108 531 53.0% 11.2% 28.6% 1.0%
92 408 80.0% 2.3% 7.9% 1.7%
52 289 55.3% 4.4% 14.2% 1.9%
5 1 4 8 3 54.8% -2.2% 30.0% 2.6%
16 398 29.7% 6.3% 48.3% 2.3%
79 021 61.2% 5.2% 24.1% 1.6%
non-OECD
countries
11.5%
6.3%
4.1%
5.0%
3.2%
6.2%
7.1%
24.2%
14.8%
11.6%
7.9%
Table 8 Foreign direct investment of Dutch companies by World regions
1 9 7 7
1 9 7 8
1 9 7 9
1 9 8 0
1981
1 9 8 2
1 9 8 3
1 9 8 4
1985
1 9 8 6
1 9 8 7
1 9 8 8
1 9 8 9
1 9 9 0
1991
1 9 9 2
1993
1 9 9 4
1995
total FDI percentages of which were directed to:
billion
Guilders;
current
prices
3,815
5,596
6,519
7,803
9,114
7,015
6,027
8,172
9,461
7,401
14,086
8,741
24,120
24,742
23,046
24,953
19,312
21,677
19,952
EU-12
countries
USA Japan
46.1% 13.2%
49.2% 28.5%
57.4% 28.8%
58.1% 22.1%
5 6 . 5  % 21.4%
49.7% 35.2%
60.4% 28.6%
68.6% 17.1%
36.4% 36.8%
7 0 . 5  % 20.5%
42.4% 48.1%
29.0% 34.5%
51.8% 30.4%
57.9% 22.7%
6 7 . 5  % 14.7%
62.1% 23.3%
77.4% 11.6%
74.1% 0.5%
57.9% 11.7%
0.1%
0.3%
0.0%
0.2%
0.2%
0.0%
1.5%
0.7%
1.9%
-0.7%
0.2%
1.4%
0.2%
1,.5%
1.6%
- 0 . 1
-14.5
-0.3
4.0%
Eastern
Europe
-0.2%
-0.04%
0.1%
0.1%
0 . 0 5  %
1.3%
3.2%
5.3%
3.4%
10.1%
Develop- of which:
ing coun- S.E.
tries Asia*
32.2%
16.8%
6.8%
10.9%
10.2%
9.3%
7.7%
8.7%
24.6%
4.7%
4.6%
18.7%
11.1%
9.9%
9.3%
5.4%
10.9%
1.6%
0.8%
2.9%
5.2%
2.3%
5.7%
1.6%
3.2%
9.5%
5.5%
* China, Philippines, HongKong,  Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea.
The above tables show a quite diverse picture, and inferences about time trends need to be
drawn with caution since the series are short and erratic. The French and German figures show
a substantial increase of foreign direct investment from the 1980s to the present which, in prin-
ciple, is what globalization theorists would expect. This does not hold for the UK and The
Netherlands, however, where the FDI figures are more or less stagnant. ‘
For a judgement about globalization theory not only the development of total FDI but also its
destination is important. Globalization theory implies that a growing share of FDI is world-wide
in scope, and that low-wage countries in particular should attract increasing shares. This is clear-
ly not the case. The only exception could be the share of British FDI in underdeveloped coun-
tries which showed a slight increase from 1987 to 1994. Given the short observation period and
the erratic nature of investment data, however, we have to be cautious with this conclusion. The
French and Dutch data do not show an increasing share of underdeveloped (or in the French
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case: non-OECD) countries in total FDI, while the German data reveal even a clearly declining
share of ‘developing and transition countries’ in the growing volume of FDI.
The lion’s share of German FDI is directed towards EU countries and seems even to grow over
time. It might be debated whether the French and UK data show a similar trend towards grow-
ing European shares of their FDI or whether these shares remain more or less unchanged. In
any case, we can conclude that the shares of French and British FDI directed to countries out-
side the EU are not increasing, and this also applies to the Netherlands. Again, this is inconsis-
tent with the globalization theory.
In conclusion, evidence from export figures and from FDI data are largely in conflict with the
globalization theory. Exports by EU countries (as a percentage of GNP) to non-EU countries
have almost stagnated since the 1960s  while the corresponding percentage of intra-EU trade has
doubled. We could still debate whether an increasing European scope also holds for FDI. This is
certainly the case for Germany; in the French, British and Dutch cases, the trend towards ‘Euro-
peanization’ of FDI is less pronounced, but the figures do not show a trend towards increasing
‘mondialization’ or ‘globalization’. We conclude that export and FDI figures show little evi-
dence of any increasing integration between the European trade bloc and the World’s other trade
blocs.
Our observation that structural change goes in the direction of increasing ‘Europeanization’
rather than ‘globalization’ is consistent with the conclusion reached by Ruigrok & Van Tulder
(1995). In an analysis of the structure of large multinationals, these authors conclude that even
companies that operate world-wide still focus strongly on their home countries. Moreover, Pate1
& Pavitt (1991) consider their own analysis of the technological strategies of the World’s largest
firms to be “an important case of non-globalization” (subtitle).
Critics may argue that quite large streams of speculative capital exist in money markets and
stock exchanges which may be ‘global’ in scope and which we did not consider in our above
Tables. In addition, we have not examined the hypothesis of increasing convergence of factor
prices on a world scale. This would certainly provide material for another paper. In the mean-
time, globalization theorists should be concerned about non-globalization patterns in at least
three important areas: (1) international trade, (2) foreign direct investment, and (3) technological
strategies of multinational firms which require explanation.
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III Possible explanations of the non-globalization process
The notion that ‘footloose’ capital will move around the globe to those places where profit op-
portunities are most favourable suggests that, due to a possible combination of Western techno-
logy with extremely low wages, low-wage countries should be in a strong position when compe-
ting for foreign investors. Their ability to attract foreign investment should be further enhanced
by recent advances in information and communication technology which make the management
of world-wide operations (‘global sourcing’) even more cheap and efficient. Why, then, are
transactions with low-wage countries still of such modest importance to the rich countries?
There are pieces of knowledge from innovation research which suggest that knowledge-intensive
business is not as footloose as one might expect from an orthodox neo-classical view. An impor-
tant argument relates to so-called ‘tacit’ knowledge. It has been suggested that, in addition to
formalised, well-documented and tradable knowledge, ‘tacit’ knowledge plays an important role
in innovative activities. Tacit knowledge is based on practical experience with certain
technologies. It has also been characterised as ‘implicit’, ‘idiosyncratic’ or ‘uncodified’  know-
ledge which is not available in textbooks or training courses, although it may be transferred
from person to person (Dosi 1988).
These properties of ‘tacitness’ have a number of implications for firm behaviour, one of which is
significant in the context of this paper: the transfer of tacit knowledge requires personal contact
and physical proximity. Nooteboom (1996) suggests that, notably in the early stages of develop-
ment of new technologies, tacitness may be important, while technologies in a riper stage will
increasingly be characterised by knowledge that is more formalised, better documented and
more easily transferable across geographical distance.
This latter point would explain why new innovative industries concentrate in Marshallian ‘indus-
trial districts’. Neo-Schumpeterian (or evolutionary) theorists stress the crucial role of variety for
innovative activities within such industrial districts; in other words, networking interactions in
close geographic space of firms and persons with different types of ‘idosyncratic’  tacit know-
ledge may promote innovation (cf. Nooteboom 1992). Such arguments about tacit knowledge
may explain why, for innovative business, local or regional embeddedness is more important
than the factor price differentials that are so important in traditional neoclassical thitLing  and
which can lead one to believe in ‘globalization’. Arguments in favour of regional embeddedness
are supported by empirical evidence that, due to knowledge spillovers, agglomerated regions in
highly developed countries are better ‘breeding places’ for innovation than are rural areas (see
for the US: Jaffee 1986 and Feldman 1994; for the Netherlands see: Brouwer & Kleinknecht
1996).
An additional argument in this context is that ‘high tech’ often requires ‘high touch’. For in-
stance, repair and maintenance services (e.g. the mastering of machine breakdowns) often can-
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not be performed through a satellite connection. They require the physical presence of specia-
lists; moreover, in communication about subtle technical details, language barriers and cultural
differences can be important thresholds. Adherents of modem endogenous growth theory would
add that, besides cultural differences, the most important threshold for the diffusion of modem
technology in low wage countries is the notorious lack of qualified labour.  Obviously, other ar-
guments could be added, such as the quality of the public infrastructure and public services (po-
litical stability, corruption, etc.).
Such arguments make it understandable why, in spite of impressive differences in factor prices
(and notably in wages), industry is much less ‘footloose’ than might be expected from simple
versions of neo-classical theory. Even neo-classical economists should be reluctant to believe
that Asian ‘tigers’ will be able to combine highly productive labour  (using modem Western tech-
nology) with extremely low wages, simply because wages tend to equal marginal productivity.
Moreover, Paul Krugman  (1996) has recently convincingly criticised  the notion of competition
between countries. He also pointed out that the popular fear that Asian tigers would destroy our
employment and welfare by producing tremendous export surpluses and, at the same time, by
becoming net importers of capital, is to be ascribed to lack of knowledge of the basics of inter-
national trade theory.
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